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Introduction 
 
Immigration designates the process whereby people move from one state into another for 
the purposes of temporary or permanent settlement.1 Policy responses to immigration raise 
the politically salient question of how open the territorial borders of states should be to 
potential immigrants. In addressing this question, most theoretical debates assume that states 
and their citizenry have a right to unilaterally control their borders – the territorial right to 
exclude. They then ask how that right ought to be exercised in light of the needs and interests 
of would-be immigrants. Advocates of open borders who take this approach argue that even 
if a state has a right to unilaterally control its territorial borders, exercising this right by 
closing its borders to would-be immigrants would be wrong or unjustified.2 Increasingly, 
however, the debate has begun to examine whether states have such a unilateral territorial 
right to exclude outsiders in the first place.3  
The present article focuses on the latter issue. Further, since its subject is immigration – 
as opposed to other forms of transborder movement, such as tourism – it considers the 
unilateral right to exclude outsiders from settling in a given territory.  Why examine this 
issue? Isn’t the more common question – that is, the question of whether particular 
immigration controls set by a state are morally justifiable – more important than the question 
of whether a state is entitled to set its border policy unilaterally? 
Although the first question is indeed highly important, the second question matters 
greatly nonetheless. In the first place, when adopting a critical stance towards contemporary 
states’ immigration practices, as the present article will do, considering it is dialectically 
advantageous. The claim that given immigration controls are acceptable depends on the 
moral justification of the controls themselves – how well they respond to the competing 
claims of would-be immigrants and residents – but also on whether the controls came about 
through the right procedure. Just as an otherwise laudable law may plausibly be deemed 
illegitimate if imposed by a dictator, so immigration controls seem unacceptable if they are 
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legislated by a group that lacks the right to do so unilaterally.  Hence, while one way to 
criticize given immigration controls is to cast doubt on their intrinsic moral standing, another 
is to show that they are typically introduced through procedures that exclude some who ought 
to have a say. Complementing the former approach with the latter only enriches and 
strengthens critiques of contemporary states’ immigration practices.  
Secondly, and more positively, interrogating the assertion that states have a right to 
unilaterally set their border policy introduces more explicitly a political dimension to ethical 
discussions of immigration controls. By bringing to the foreground the issue of who should 
have a say in deciding what border policies should be implemented, this line of inquiry helps 
us think more clearly about what the appropriate political arena is for raising and debating 
competing views regarding border controls.4 So, investigating this question not only opens up 
further possibilities for critically assessing contemporary immigration policies, but it also 
supplies positive guidance regarding how we should reform political institutions to determine 
the shape of border policies in the future.5 
In the context of this important second question, then, I will concentrate specifically on 
the argument that a given state’s citizenry has a unilateral right to exclude would-be 
immigrants by virtue of its right to self-determination. This “self-determination argument” 
warrants close examination, given that it is one of the most commonly invoked arguments, 
both in political discourse and in political philosophy, for why states allegedly have such a 
right.6 Put more precisely, the self-determination argument for why a specific group G 
possesses the right to exclude runs as follows. 
 
Bounded Self thesis: Territorially-bounded group G has the right to 
determine itself, which includes the right to determine its membership, or 
civic boundaries. 
 
Territorial thesis: This right to self-determination grounds a right to 
unilaterally control the territorial borders of the state that contains G.  
 
So, G has the right to unilaterally control the borders of this state.  
 
I refer to the problem of justifying the Bounded Self thesis as the Problem of the Self.7 Thus, 
addressing the Problem of the Self requires demonstrating that a given territorially-bounded 
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group has such a right to self-determination. The problem of justifying the Territorial thesis is 
the Territorial Problem.  
With this background in place, I aim to show that attempts to address either of these two 
problems reveal that the self-determination argument faces serious – if not insurmountable – 
difficulties deriving from a common source, the Coercion Principle. According to the 
Coercion Principle, all persons subjected to coercive political power are entitled to participate 
as equals in determining how that power is exercised. By appealing to this principle, Arash 
Abizadeh has famously criticized attempts to address the Problem of the Self.8 However, and 
as we will see, his criticism has recently met with significant resistance. In this context, the 
purpose of the present article is to challenge the self-determination argument partly by 
defending Abizadeh’s charge, and partly by deepening it in order to remediate its limitations 
and produce a more intractable challenge. Indeed, not only will I uphold the claim that the 
Coercion Principle undermines some strategies for addressing the Problem of the Self against 
recent critics, but I will also demonstrate the novel thesis that the Coercion Principle is bound 
to be presupposed by answers to the Territorial Problem in such a way as to render the self-
determination argument self-defeating. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, after considering answers to the 
Problem of the Self that conceptualize the self as politically-constituted, I defend Abizadeh’s 
argument that this strategy fails because of democratic theory’s reliance on the Coercion 
Principle (Section 1). Nevertheless, even with this defense in place, Abizadeh’s objection 
remains vulnerable: in particular, it is possible to circumvent his objection by specifying the 
self pre-politically. For this reason, I then demonstrate that attempts to justify the Territorial 
thesis also presuppose the Coercion Principle’s truth. Hence, whichever way one tries to 
specify the self, the self-determination argument is bound to rely on the Coercion Principle 
(Section 2). Finally, by showing territorial borders to be coercive to many outsiders, I 
establish that the Coercion Principle opposes the right to unilaterally control one’s territorial 
borders. Thus, the self-determination argument is self-defeating: attempts to justify its 
premises are bound to rely on a principle which in fact conflicts with its conclusion, and 
thereby internally undermines it   (Section 3).   
 
1. The Politically-Bounded Self and the Coercion Principle 
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For proponents of the self-determination argument, there are two ways of addressing the 
Problem of the Self. First, one might identify a pre-political group defined by cultural and/or 
historical ties, and argue that it has the right to determine itself via the state’s political 
agency. Alternatively, one might assert that the group entitled to self-determination is 
politically constituted. 
The latter strategy may seem more appealing insofar as it avoids skepticism regarding the 
existence of pre-political selves,9 and circumvents the difficulties involved in establishing the 
congruence between the pre-political self and state boundaries.10 Accordingly, I first consider 
the political route to answering the Problem of the Self. To say that the self is politically 
constituted means that the civic boundaries which delineate it are defined by political 
procedures or political principles. Since the aim here is to specify a self that has the right to 
self-determination, and because this right is commonly associated with the democratic 
political ideal, this approach to the Problem of the Self typically involves showing that 
democratic theory can identify a territorially-bounded group that has the right to determine 
itself. 
 
1.1. The Unbounded Demos 
 
A first way to constitute the self politically is by determining the civic boundaries which 
define it through democratic procedures. However, a familiar criticism of this approach is 
that it is viciously circular. To determine the bounds of the self-determining group through 
democratic procedures, we must know who has a right to participate in democratic decision-
making. But this is what the procedure was intended to determine. From this observation, 
Whelan concludes that “democracy, which is a method for group decision-making or self-
governance, cannot be brought to bear on the logically prior matter of the constitution of the 
group itself, the existence of which it presupposes”.11  
 Nevertheless, Whelan’s conclusion is too quick: even if democratic procedures cannot 
specify the bounded self, normative principles internal to democratic theory might allow us to 
do so.12 On this approach, democratic theory’s principles identify constitutive 
presuppositions of democratic procedures which provide criteria for determining who has a 
right to participate, and thus who the bounded self comprises.  
However, as Abizadeh has recently argued, democratic principles in fact do not seem to 
justify setting boundaries on political participation. According to Abizadeh, the fundamental 
democratic principle is the Coercion Principle. This principle states that all those subjected to 
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coercive political power should be included in the demos, so that they have the right to 
participate as equals in determining how that power is exercised. Indeed, for Abizadeh, 
democratic theory is fundamentally premised on the basic freedom and moral equality of 
individuals. Responding to this freedom and equality requires giving equal consideration to 
persons’ autonomy. Therefore, given that coercion tends to severely reduce the personal 
autonomy of those who are coerced, democratic theory holds that respecting the autonomy of 
individuals subjected to political coercion requires granting them the right to participate 
politically as equals in determining how that coercion is exercised.13  
Now, the Coercion Principle fails to justify restricting the self-determining group to a 
territorially-bounded unit. Indeed, it renders the demos in principle unbounded: if persons 
outside territorial borders were subjected to political power exercised by those inside, then, 
according to the Coercion Principle, they would have political participation rights. Therefore, 
the first upshot of democratic theory’s reliance on this principle is that other grounds than 
democratic standards are needed to restrict the self to a territorially-bounded unit and justify 
the Bounded Self thesis.   
Furthermore, and more significantly, the Coercion Principle not only does not justify, but 
in fact opposes the Bounded Self thesis. This is because “civic boundaries pose by their very 
nature an externality problem: […] the act of constituting boundaries circumscribing political 
rights is always an exercise of power over both insiders and outsiders  that […] purports to 
disenfranchise the outsiders over whom power is exercised.”14 This is especially true if – as 
proponents of the self-determination argument want to argue – membership involves a right 
to unilaterally control the group’s territorial borders.15 Consequently, the Coercion Principle 
demands that the constitution of civic boundaries, which regulate membership, be 
democratically justified to insiders and outsiders, so that there can be no unilateral right for a 
group to set its civic boundaries. In sum, combined with the claim that establishing and 
controlling civic and territorial boundaries is coercive to outsiders, democratic theory’s 
Coercion Principle opposes the existence of a territorially-bounded self that is self-
determining in the sense of having the right to unilaterally determine its shape and 
membership.  
Now, this argument for why the political strategy fails to justify the Bounded Self thesis 
might seem problematic for several reasons. In 1.2, I will respond to a criticism of the 
conditional claim that if one takes the Coercion Principle to be a central principle of 
democratic theory, then democratic theory opposes the Bounded Self thesis. But in the 
meantime, a more immediate worry concerns the antecedent of this claim: Abizadeh’s 
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assertion that the Coercion Principle is a fundamental democratic principle may appear overly 
hasty and contentious. Indeed, while it is not uncommon for democratic theorists to endorse a 
version of the Coercion Principle,16 many alternative principles specifying who should be 
included in the demos have been suggested by theorists working on the democratic boundary 
problem – that is, the problem of who belongs to the demos.  
For the purposes of my argument, however, this theoretical controversy is relatively 
unproblematic. This is because the most plausible alternative democratic principles of 
inclusion share the Coercion Principle’s crucial recommendation (discussed at greater length 
below) that very many outsiders, including destitute would-be immigrants, should have a say 
in controlling a state’s civic and territorial boundaries. Indeed, the most prominent rival 
principle is the All-Affected Principle, which claims that all and only those who are affected 
by a state decision should have a say in making that decision.17 Since individuals who are 
coerced by a state decision are a subset of those affected by that decision, the All-Affected 
Principle would support the Coercion Principle’s above recommendation. Hence, Abizadeh’s 
argument, as well as mine, would still go through even if we accepted this alternative 
principle instead. So, in the context of our discussion, controversies within the literature on 
the democratic boundary problem are broadly18 unproblematic for the suggestion that we take 
the Coercion Principle to be a fundamental tenet of democratic theory. 
Even so, one might harbor reservations regarding the Coercion Principle’s plausibility. 
Let us briefly consider two such worries. To begin, the principle may appear to have the 
following counterintuitive implication: if Germany wanted to annex Poland, the Coercion 
Principle seemingly entails that Poles may not forcibly resist this annexation unless this 
resistance is approved of in a democratic decision where both Poles and Germans have an 
equal say.  While this would be an unpalatable result, advocates of the Coercion Principle can 
respond in two ways. Firstly, the annexation of Poland by Germany would in the first 
instance subject Poles to coercion, not Germans. Hence, the Coercion Principle requires that 
there be a prior democratic decision where all and only those subjected to coercion (i.e., 
Poles) have a say in deciding whether the annexation should occur in the first place. Unless 
they also wanted the annexation, Poles would presumably decide against the merger. 
Secondly, if this prior decision does not occur, or if Germany goes forward with the 
annexation regardless, then it seems plausible to think that in unjustly annexing Poland, 
Germans have waived their right to participate in the subsequent decision regarding whether 
the annexation might be forcibly resisted. Although these two lines of response would need to 
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be spelled out in greater detail, they suggest that the Coercion Principle need not have the 
above undesirable implication.   
A second worry is more foundational. According to Richard Arneson, having a 
democratic say in a decision D involves having some measure of coercive power over other 
people who are subjected to D. But “there is no […] basic moral right to exercise significant 
power over the lives of other people, to direct how they shall live their lives”.19 So, whereas 
the Coercion Principle moves from the wrongness of coercion to the claim that those 
subjected to coercion have a right to a democratic say, Arneson seemingly takes the 
wrongness of coercion to point in exactly the opposite direction. Accordingly, the rationale 
for the Coercion Principle seems obscure.  
In fact, however, upon closer examination, Arneson’s position can be reconciled with 
appreciating the Coercion Principle’s appeal. Notice that in context, Arneson is denying that 
there is a basic right to a democratic say, a right that is non-derivatively or non-
instrumentally justified. Again, this is because in itself, it is pro tanto morally problematic to 
exercise coercive power over other autonomous human beings. But Arneson accepts that a 
right to a democratic say can be justified instrumentally, when its pro tanto wrongness is 
overridden by its benefits.20  
With this observation in mind, recall that the Coercion Principle says that when agent A is 
subjected to coercive power by B, she is entitled to participate, alongside other subjects of 
that power, in deciding how it is exercised. So the Coercion Principle does not suggest 
introducing entirely new instances of coercion where there were none. Rather, it recommends 
changing the procedures for deciding how existing coercive power is exercised. While this 
does mean that A ends up having some coercive power over others, Arneson may well think 
that replacing B’s unilateral power over A with a situation where A, B, and all other subjects 
of the power have a say is a moral improvement, all things considered. A strong rationale for 
thinking that the new situation is better overall is that since all subjects of coercive power 
have some influence over how it is used, they can exercise checks on one another. This 
reduces the likelihood that the coercive power in question will be employed arbitrarily.21 And 
intuitively, arbitrary coercive power is morally worse and more inimical to personal 
autonomy than non-arbitrary power. Therefore, even if, like Arneson, one thinks that having 
a democratic say is intrinsically morally problematic because it involves exercising coercive 
power over others, granting individuals a right to a democratic say in the way required by the 
Coercion Principle may well be justified overall. Once more, this is because it tends to 
transform arbitrary coercive power into non-arbitrary coercive power.22 
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Let us take stock. Abizadeh argues that the political strategy for justifying the Bounded 
Self thesis fails because of democratic theory’s reliance on the Coercion Principle. Contra 
potential critics, I have defended the plausibility of taking the Coercion Principle to be a 
fundamental thesis of democratic theory. In Section 2, I will go beyond Abizadeh and offer 
an argument that should be appealing even to those who remain unconvinced that the 
Coercion Principle lies at the heart of the democratic ideal. Indeed, as advertised in the 
introduction, I will show that the Coercion Principle is also presupposed by proponents of the 
self-determination argument at a later stage, when justifying the Territoral thesis. But before 
doing so, I uphold Abizadeh’s critique of the political strategy against a second type of 
objection.  
 
1.2.  Defending the Unbounded Demos 
 
A powerful objection to Abizadeh’s above argument asserts that the democratic ideal 
does not reduce to the Coercion Principle. It involves further internal standards, which justify 
restricting the self-determining demos to a territorially-bounded group. Accordingly, for 
Sarah Song, the basic democratic value is political equality. Political equality, she suggests, 
requires the formal participatory rights guaranteed by the Coercion Principle, but also that 
certain substantive conditions be met. First, having real opportunities to participate politically 
as equals requires a certain measure of resource equality. Second, sincere and respectful 
deliberation between equals requires interpersonal solidarity and trust. Securing these 
substantive conditions of democracy necessitates a stable and shared culture. The modern 
territorially-bounded state, Song concludes, picks out such a stable and culturally-defined 
demos.23 
This argument has two problems. First, such cultural and territorial boundaries on the 
demos are not constitutive of the democratic ideal of political equality. This ideal says that 
moral equals subjected to political power have a right to participate politically as equals. It 
therefore asserts something about (1) who has a right to political equality and (2) what that 
political equality involves. Song’s two substantive conditions of political equality correspond 
to the second element, and are therefore indeed constitutive of democracy. However, 
bounding the demos into a stable culturally-homogeneous group is not: though it may 
advance the substantive conditions of political equality, it does so at the expense of its first 
constitutive component. Indeed, given the “externality problem” posed by civic and territorial 
boundaries, restricting the demos that controls them to a culturally-homogeneous state 
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excludes some individuals who are subjected to coercive political power. Song’s mistake, 
then, is this: though she correctly affirms that genuine political equality requires that certain 
substantive conditions be satisfied, she overlooks the fact that this does not change who is 
entitled to such equality. Accordingly, unless the democratic ideal is incoherent, a stable and 
culturally-homogeneous demos cannot be a constitutive presupposition of democracy. 
Instead, such a restriction on the demos is a way of realizing substantive political equality 
between some individuals in circumstances where both constitutive conditions of democratic 
political equality cannot simultaneously be satisfied. But since democratic theory itself is 
silent on which of its constitutive conditions we should privilege in such circumstances,24 it 
alone does not justify such a restriction.  
Second, suppose we conceded that in non-ideal circumstances where both constitutive 
conditions cannot be realized, democratic theory did justify restricting the demos to achieve 
substantive political equality, at the cost of not including everyone who is subjected to 
coercive political power. Because we are considering an argument for a territorially-bounded 
group’s unilateral territorial right to exclude, Song would still have to establish the stronger 
claim that the restriction needed to achieve substantive political equality excludes all would-
be immigrants from the bounded self.  
However, this stronger claim seems implausible. First, one might deny that solidarity and 
trust require cultural similarity.25 But even if they do, there is significant cross-border cultural 
overlap, and invariably significant internal cultural variation within states.26 Consequently, 
not only does it seem unlikely that the levels of cultural homogeneity required for substantive 
political equality justify excluding all would-be immigrants, but Song could not argue for this 
conclusion without also implying that many resident citizens of current states need to be 
excluded.  
Even so, couldn’t Song respond that solidarity also requires group stability and that 
extending political rights to any would-be immigrants would undermine such stability?27 This 
response seems empirically contentious. As Fine has observed, even in the absence of 
outsider participation, state populations are generally not as stable as Song suggests: “the 
population is always in flux, as generations pass on, some members emigrate, and children 
become fully participating members”.28 The fact that this does not threaten solidarity and its 
constituent norms of reciprocity suggests that solidarity is continuously recreated and is not 
necessarily the result of a long history of interaction amongst a stable group. As a result, 
contra Song, it seems implausible to think that extending political rights to some would-be 
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immigrants would undermine group stability in such a way as to prevent norms of solidarity 
from developing. 
In sum, I have upheld the plausibility of Abizadeh’s assertion that because of its reliance 
on the Coercion Principle, and even in light of its further internal standards, democratic 
theory does not justify the Bounded Self thesis. Indeed, because it does not support excluding 
all potential immigrants from the self-determining group it defines, this group is not 
territorially-bounded. Consequently, unless it can be shown that border controls are in fact 
not coercive to outsiders – an objection I consider in Section 3 – the political strategy to 
addressing the Problem of the Self fails. 
 
2. The Pre-Political Self and the Coercion Principle 
 
Justifying the Bounded Self thesis by appealing to democratic theory’s political principles 
is unpromising because democratic theory, it is plausible to think, relies on the Coercion 
Principle. To circumvent this objection, advocates of the self-determination argument might 
attempt to address the Problem of the Self by identifying a pre-political self, whose bounds 
are specified by principles external to democratic theory.29 I will argue that this attempt at 
evading the problem is ultimately unsuccessful, because the self-determination argument also 
relies on the Coercion Principle at a later stage, when justifying the Territorial thesis. In 
virtue of establishing this novel thesis, my critique of the self-determination argument has 
greater scope and is more intractable than Abizadeh’s in two important ways. It demonstrates 
that the Coercion Principle generates profound difficulties even for 1) those who employ the 
pre-political strategy for justifying the Bounded Self thesis, and 2) those who remain doubtful 
– contra Section 1 – that the Coercion Principle lies at the heart of the democratic ideal. 
2.1. The Pre-Political Self 
 
The most influential attempt to specify a pre-political territorially-bounded self that has 
the right to self-determination is the cultural-nationalist approach theorized by David Miller. 
Briefly put, on this view, the self is determined by a shared national identity consisting of 
shared beliefs, historical continuity, a common public culture, and attachment to a 
geographical location.30 Because national identity involves attachment to a given territory, it 
seems to pick out the kind of territorially-bounded group that the Bounded Self thesis refers 
to. Further, national identity is taken to be ethically relevant: because it “provides [its 
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members] with a background against which more individual choices about how to live can be 
made”,31 members of a nation have a powerful interest in maintaining their national culture, 
which grounds a right to self-determination. This right allows the nation to collectively define 
and carry out its projects through political institutions. Finally, since a crucial national project 
is determining who the self is, nations thereby have a right to set the terms of membership.32 
Now, as mentioned earlier, the notion of a pre-political self is not uncontroversial. Some 
express skepticism about the possibility of specifying determinate nations without resorting 
to cultural reification.33 Others claim that it is unlikely that nations will coincide with states’ 
territorial borders, so that, given the current state system, the interest in preserving national 
identity cannot justify granting a given nation a territorial right to exclude.34  
Nevertheless, I wish to set aside these worries and concede that they are not insuperable 
for the cultural-nationalist approach. Instead, I will argue that this alternative answer to the 
Problem of the Self only temporarily avoids the problem posed by the Coercion Principle. To 
begin, recall that – assuming that border controls are coercive to outsiders – the Coercion 
Principle not only does not justify the Bounded Self thesis, but also opposes it. However, I 
grant for the time being that the interest in national self-determination – or whatever grounds 
are given for the pre-political self – can override the Coercion Principle’s appeal and justify 
the Bounded Self thesis. What I will now show is that even if we grant this, the Coercion 
Principle undermines the self-determination argument at another level: justifications for the 
Territorial thesis are bound to presuppose the Coercion Principle in such a way as to render 
the self-determination argument self-defeating. 
 
2.2. The Territorial Problem and the Coercion Principle 
 
Let us assume that there exists a pre-political territorially-bounded self that has the right 
to determine itself. The Territorial thesis then asserts that this right grounds a right to 
unilaterally control the territory’s boundaries. But what justifies this thesis? At first glance, 
the mere presence of non-members on a territory does not seem to directly impede the self’s 
determination of its future shape and projects.35 The right to self-determination consequently 
does not seem to directly entail a territorial right to exclude. 
To establish the Territorial thesis, the self-determination argument therefore appeals to a 
further premise. This is most clearly expressed by Walzer’s “principle of political justice”. 
This principle states that persons settled in a territory ought to be granted citizenship rights, 
including political participation rights, because such residents are systematically subjected to 
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political power.36 Now, unlike tourists, immigrants by definition settle in a territory. Hence, a 
group’s ability to control its membership depends on its ability to control immigration, as 
immigrants must be granted citizenship rights. Thus, because the principle of political justice 
demands that civic boundaries be extended to include residents, a group’s right to determine 
its shape and civic boundaries entails a right to unilaterally control who comes to reside in its 
territory, and therefore entails a right to unilaterally control its territorial borders.37 
Importantly, this justification of the link between the right to self-determination and the 
right to unilaterally control one’s own territorial borders is not specific to Walzer, but is 
widespread amongst proponents of the self-determination argument.38 Miller, for instance, 
puts forth a version of this justification. In line with Walzer’s principle of political justice, he 
argues that in order to avoid the creation of a category of second-class citizens, which would 
be profoundly illiberal, residents subjected to state power must be granted equal citizenship 
rights.39 Now, liberal nation-states are committed to realizing social justice, and this involves 
granting citizens not merely formal political rights, but also extensive socioeconomic rights. 
As a result, high levels of immigration risk increasing the cost of social welfare policies. 
Moreover, if immigration levels are so high that mutual cultural adjustment cannot take place, 
the communal solidarity necessary to sustain welfare spending may weaken.40 As such, given 
that residents must be granted equal membership rights, high levels of immigration threaten 
social welfare programs. But such programs are constitutive of a national commitment to 
realizing social justice. Therefore, for Miller, national self-determination – which involves 
determining the self’s shape and pursuing national projects – requires controlling immigration 
levels.41 
The problem for the self-determination argument is now clear. The principle of political 
justice affirms that because residents are subjected to political power, it would be tyrannical 
or illiberal not to grant them membership rights. But this just is the Coercion Principle, 
applied restrictively to state residents.42 Therefore, if the Coercion Principle opposes 
unilateral control over territorial borders, and if the Territorial thesis’ justification presupposes 
the Coercion Principle, then this principle internally undermines the self-determination 
argument. To explain: this argument’s defenders can no longer assert that although the 
Coercion Principle opposes the territorial right to exclude, the value of national self-
determination overrides this principle. This is because the inference from the right to self-
determination to the territorial right to exclude is only plausible insofar as the principle of 
political justice is compelling, and that principle is itself only plausible insofar as the more 
general Coercion Principle is. Thus, if the Coercion Principle opposes the territorial right to 
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exclude, the self-determination argument is rendered self-defeating: because it implicitly 
relies on the Coercion Principle, it can be no more compelling than the principle that entails a 
denial of its conclusion.  
Two replies are available to the proponent of the self-determination argument. The first 
consists in objecting that the Territorial thesis does not necessarily rely on the Coercion 
Principle. The second denies that doing so is problematic, by arguing that territorial border 
controls are in fact not coercive to outsiders, and that the Coercion Principle therefore does 
not oppose granting a territorially-bounded group the right to unilaterally control its borders. 
The rest of this essay addresses these objections in turn.  
 
2.3.   Is the Objection Ad Hominem? 
 
A first reply is that my challenge is merely ad hominem. Though proponents of the self-
determination argument do appeal – explicitly or tacitly – to the principle of political justice 
which itself relies on the Coercion Principle, they need not do so. In fact, the objection 
continues, closer attention to my presentation of the self-determination argument suggests 
another way of justifying the Territorial thesis.  
The self-determination argument outlined in the previous section appeals to the fact that 
residents are subjected to power exercised by the self-determining group over a given 
territory. Now, a territorial right to exclude cannot derive from the principle of political 
justice in conjunction with brute exercise of power over a given territory and its residents, as 
that would amount to claiming that might makes right. Consequently, this argument 
presupposes not merely that the self-determining group exercises political power over a 
territory, but also that it is entitled to do so. Thus, the right to self-determination deriving from 
pre-political grounds is taken to include a right to territorial jurisdiction – a right to “make and 
enforce rules over a bounded geographical area”43 – prior to any appeal to the principle of 
political justice. But if these pre-political grounds can directly justify some territorial rights, 
why can’t they directly justify a territorial right to exclude as well?  
In fact, as Ypi argues, the right to exclude is more difficult to justify than other territorial 
rights.44 Consider again the cultural-nationalist argument for the right to self-determination. 
This right derives from the interest in preserving national identity. Further, national identity is 
bound up with a specific territory that the nation has transformed materially and symbolically, 
so that its “members develop a collective attachment to a land that becomes inseparable [sic] 
part of who they are”.45 This symbolic value grounds a consequentialist argument for granting 
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rights of territorial jurisdiction and to manage natural resources as components of the right to 
self-determination. Such rights give members “continuing access to places that are especially 
significant to them, and it allows choices to be made over how these sites are to be protected 
and managed”.46 In this way, these rights allow the preservation of the symbolic value that the 
land possesses as a constituent of the nation’s identity. 
However, this cultural-nationalist argument seems incapable of directly justifying a 
territorial right to exclude. First, it is unclear why the mere presence of others would detract 
from land’s symbolic value for a group, and so why the interest in preserving this value 
justifies a right to exclude. One prominent suggestion is that overcrowding risks damaging 
national landmarks.47 Since the territorial exclusion of individuals is necessary to prevent 
overcrowding, it is therefore required as a means of protecting national identity. 
Here, I will not dispute the premise that if immigration, by generating overcrowding, 
damages national landmarks, then the value of national identity supplies powerful reasons for 
granting the national group a territorial right to exclude. But even conceding this, the 
‘overcrowding’ argument relies on an assumption that is empirically dubious. Indeed, Ypi has 
observed that valuable sites that have been declared UNESCO “Common Heritage of 
Humanity” are often better protected than those that have not, even though they are visited by 
immense numbers of tourists.48 What this example suggests is that national landmarks can be 
adequately protected in spite of overcrowding. Accordingly, on the evidence Ypi supplies, 
which is corroborated for instance by Janna Thompson,49 preventing overcrowding is not a 
necessary condition for protecting symbolically valuable sites. Thus, even if immigration 
were liable to lead to high population densities, protecting national identity would not 
necessitate granting the relevant group a unilateral right to control its borders.  
One might object that Ypi’s reply is overly hasty, or at least inadequate for our purposes. 
Firstly, her UNESCO example is about tourists, not immigrants. This might seem 
problematic, since I stated earlier that this paper is concerned with immigration rather than 
tourism. While this is true, what matters here is less whether the individuals in question are 
tourists or immigrants, and more that there are extremely many of them in the vicinity of 
national landmarks. This is sufficient to cast doubt on the claim that a necessary empirical 
connection obtains between overcrowding and damage to symbolically valuable sites.  
A second worry is that countries with UNESCO sites currently do have border controls in 
place. So perhaps we cannot infer from Ypi’s example that national landmarks could be 
protected in the absence of exclusionary practices. Once more, however, this needn’t undercut 
my argument.  Even if countries with UNESCO sites have border controls, it remains true that 
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the cultural sites they possess are visited by immense numbers of individuals. So, these cases 
can still be used to weaken the purported connection between overcrowding and damage to 
national landmarks. Now, I cannot rule out in principle the possibility that without territorial 
exclusions, there might arise overcrowding so intense that traditional methods of protecting 
national landmarks are no longer efficacious. But even so, the fact that existing cases of 
overcrowding need not be damaging provides defeasible grounds for finding this empirical 
assumption suspect.50  
Nonetheless, both worries bring out the fact that my opposition to this empirical 
assumption should be qualified, as follows: I do not purport to have definitively established 
that national landmarks can always be protected in the face of overcrowding, even in the 
absence of border controls. But the existence of clear instances where national landmarks are 
very well protected despite high population densities does serve to shift the burden of proof. 
Absent further arguments to the extent 1) that immigrants are more likely to damage 
symbolically valuable sites than tourists or 2) that the population densities that would arise in 
the absence of territorial exclusions would be so high that symbolically valuable sites could 
not be protected in the way that UNESCO sites currently are, we should be unmoved by the 
‘overcrowding’ argument.   
The problems for proponents of the unilateral territorial right to exclude do not end there. 
Even if immigration were bound to reduce the symbolic value of land for a given group, a 
consequentialist argument for the territorial right to exclude would still not immediately 
follow.  Indeed, because land is often symbolically valuable to more than one group, granting 
a single nation a right to exclude has often generated conflict and thereby engendered 
disastrous consequences.51 Finally, appealing to land’s material value instead cannot help the 
cultural-nationalist: that a group has enhanced land’s material value does not provide a 
consequentialist argument for excluding others from it unless it can be shown that these others 
would not similarly generate material value.52   
In light of these special difficulties, it seems an attractive feature of the self-determination 
argument outlined in Section 2.2 that, by appealing to the principle of political justice, it 
infers the unilateral right to exclude from more easily-justifiable rights to territorial 
jurisdiction. Hence, it is more plausible to see this argument as a response to the difficulty of 
directly inferring a territorial right to exclude from the right to self-determination’s pre-
political grounds, than to see the latter type of argument as an alternative to the former. This 
provides reasons to think that the self-determination argument is bound to appeal to the 
principle of political justice when justifying its Territorial thesis. 
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To summarize, Sections 1 and 2 have shown that however the self-determination 
argument addresses the Problem of the Self, it is undermined by the Coercion Principle if 
border controls are coercive to outsiders. Since it necessarily relies on the Coercion Principle 
– either when addressing the Problem of the Self, or when answering the Territorial Problem 
– it must establish that this principle in fact does not oppose a unilateral right for the state to 
control its own territorial borders, by showing that such controls are not coercive. In what 
follows, I consider and invalidate this line of argument, as recently articulated by David 
Miller.   
 
3. The Coerciveness of Border Controls 
3.1. Autonomy and Coercion 
 
As discussed in Section 1, Abizadeh takes the Coercion Principle to be grounded in the 
value of autonomy. On this view, which David Miller also accepts,53 because coercion is 
particularly damaging to autonomy, subjecting persons to coercion is compatible with 
respecting their autonomy and hence morally acceptable only if they have a right to a 
democratic say. The idea is that having a democratic say – where this involves having not 
only equal voting power but also an equal opportunity to participate in processes of public 
justification – helps individuals hold those who exercise coercive power accountable. Thus, 
according to proponents of this view, democratic participation reduces the extent to which 
individuals are subjected to arbitrary coercive power, and so helps them retain some measure 
of control over how their lives go.54 In this light, to ascertain whether border controls are 
coercive to would-be immigrants, we must first determine what autonomy consists of, and 
how coercion violates it. 
According to Raz’s influential account, autonomy has three main components. A person is 
autonomous just in case she has the mental capacities required to form and revise projects 
(Psychological condition), has an adequate range of options to choose from (Adequacy-of-
Options condition), and is independent in the sense of not being subjected to the will of 
another (Independence condition).55 
How does coercion affect autonomy? Briefly put, A coerces B when, by employing or 
threatening to employ physical force, A intentionally creates a worse choice situation for B as 
a means of forcing B to do what A wants. Put differently, A deliberately restricts B’s options 
to make B act in conformity with A’s will. Hence, coercion damages autonomy in two ways. 
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First, it inherently reduces the range of options available to the coercee, sometimes to the 
point of leaving the coercee with an inadequate range. One’s range of options is inadequate, 
for Raz, when one’s choice is dictated by personal needs. Personal needs are “what is 
necessary to have the life one has or has set upon”.56 Second, because coercion involves the 
intention of making the coercee into an instrument of one’s will, it always violates the 
Independence condition. By virtue of involving such an intention, coercion, unlike natural 
catastrophes, constitutes a “direct assault” on autonomy, which explains why it triggers a 
demand for democratic participation.57 Having clarified what constitutes coercion, do 
territorial border controls coerce outsiders? 
 
3.2. Border Controls and the Adequacy-of-Options condition 
 
Territorial border controls undeniably restrict outsiders’ range of options. Most obviously, 
they reduce their freedom of movement by raising physical barriers ranging from fences and 
electric wires to police dogs and shooting on sight.58 Nevertheless, to constitute a violation of 
autonomy, border controls must restrict the range of options available to outsiders to an 
inadequate level, where one has at most one option capable of furnishing what is necessary to 
pursue one’s central projects. Now, restricting freedom of movement does not invariably have 
this effect. Indeed, it is often curtailed within states without anyone claiming that a vital 
interest has been injured.59 However, in many cases, would-be immigrants’ states of origin 
fail to provide them with an adequate range of options. This is the case not only of individuals 
who are persecuted in their original states, but also of those fleeing natural calamities or 
domestic situations characterized by dire economic deprivation.60 In such cases, exercising 
border controls does seem to restrict would-be immigrants’ options to an inadequate range. 
Miller, however, denies that this is so. He remarks that when a single state closes its 
borders to those situated in dire circumstances, “there are many other states that this person 
can apply to enter, including many richer states”.61 A first response is that even if Miller’s 
reply were correct, it fails to justify states’ unilateral right to exclude.  His argument is that a 
state’s border controls do not violate the Adequacy-of-Options condition because immigrants 
may immigrate elsewhere. But for any state, whether this is true depends on other states’ 
border policies. So, whether a state has a right to close its borders depends on other states’ 
policies. Consequently, states lack a unilateral right to exclude: to avoid violating the 
Adequacy-of-Options condition, they must coordinate their border policies with those of other 
states.  
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Second, the empirical accuracy of Miller’s reply is questionable. In some cases, it is 
simply false that there are many other states would-be immigrants can apply to. Consider for 
instance the European Union’s 1990 Dublin Convention. By affirming that asylum-seekers 
may only apply to immigrate in the first member state that they entered, this convention 
considerably reduces the number of other states to which they can apply.62 Further, as Fine 
has noted, “the interests in living in state A are not always interchangeable with the interests 
in living in state B or state C.”63 Indeed, only admission to a particular state will allow me to 
be reunited with my family, or with a territorially-concentrated religious group. Now, having 
the opportunity to realize such aims may very well be crucial to living a life that I recognize 
as my own, and therefore intuitively seems to constitute a personal need. In such cases, then, a 
single state’s border controls do indeed violate the Adequacy-of-Options condition for some 
would-be immigrants. 
 
3.3. Border Controls and the Independence condition 
 
Border controls, I have argued, can in many cases reduce the range of options available to 
potential immigrants to inadequate levels. Nonetheless, one might respond that even if some 
border controls have this effect, violating the Adequacy-of-Options condition is not sufficient 
to constitute coercion. Indeed, though a natural disaster may drastically reduce one’s options, 
natural disasters are not coercive. This is because, as discussed in 3.1, coercion always 
involves objectionable intentions that violate autonomy’s Independence condition. 
Now, Miller also denies that border controls violate the Independence condition. Even if 
states collectively violate the Adequacy-of-Options condition through their border controls, 
there is no collective intention to do so. Each state that refuses entry to would-be immigrants 
intends simply that they not enter its territory, not that they not migrate at all. Similarly, one 
might add, even in the above-discussed cases where a single state’s border controls suffice to 
violate the Adequacy-of-Options condition, such a state intends only to prevent would-be 
immigrants from entering its territory. Consequently, for Miller, the intentional subordination 
of the will that constitutes the specific evil of coercion is absent in the case of border 
controls.64  
However, this objection is misleading. While violating the Adequacy-of-Options 
condition requires reducing someone’s options to an inadequate range, violating the 
Independence condition does not require that one intend to restrict someone’s options below 
the adequacy threshold. The coercer need only intend a restriction of the coercee’s options as 
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a means of making the coercee act in conformity with his or her will.65 To see this, consider a 
master who threatens to physically punish a slave should he try to escape, but otherwise 
leaves him many options. Though this master does not intend to reduce the slave’s options to 
inadequate levels, the slave’s independence is intuitively violated by the master’s intention of 
restricting his options to make him refrain from escaping. This is significant, because Miller’s 
objection is based on the observation that there is no intention to reduce would-be 
immigrants’ options to an inadequate range. In light of the above, we can accept this 
observation and nonetheless maintain that single states’ border policies do involve an 
intention that violates the Independence condition by making potential immigrants into 
instruments of their will. In controlling their borders, states invariably intend to restrict 
would-be immigrants’ options as a means of getting them to advance the state’s ends by 
refraining from crossing the border unauthorized. Thus, border controls all involve “credible 
threats of physical force [that] compromise the coercee’s independence because they threaten 
to use her body for purposes that are not her own.”66 
Consequently, Section 3.2 showed that border controls violate the Adequacy-of-Options 
condition for some would-be immigrants, while Section 3.3 established that they violate the 
Independence condition for all possible would-be immigrants. Hence, even if we assume that 
violating both the Independence and the Adequacy-of-Options conditions is necessary for 
coercion – contra Raz and Abizadeh, for whom violating the Independence condition suffices 
for coercion67 – it still follows that border controls systematically coerce some would-be 
immigrants, though they do not coerce wealthy tourists or well-off would-be immigrants. 
Therefore, the Coercion Principle demands that some would-be immigrants have a right to 
participate in border policy-making, and thus opposes states’ claim to a right to unilaterally 
control their own borders. 
At this point, one might object that this conclusion retreats substantially from Abizadeh’s 
radical thesis that immigration controls coerce all would-be immigrants, so that the Coercion 
Principle mandates the inclusion of all would-be immigrants in border policy-making. Thus, 
this objection continues, I have defended the coerciveness of border controls only at the cost 
of weakening the claim Miller originally criticized.68 
While this is true, it should not obscure the fact that my conclusion remains a very strong 
one, which deeply upsets the self-determination argument. Indeed, my conclusion is not only 
that according to the Coercion Principle – which the self-determination argument presupposes 
– some would-be immigrants should participate in the border policy-making of states they 
wish to enter. Notice that flows of persons escaping war, persecution and economic 
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destitution by moving to affluent western states – persons, that is, whose options would be 
reduced to inadequate levels by a decision to close those states’ borders – are extremely 
numerous and steeply increasing.69 So, in the overwhelming majority of cases that have been 
the focus of political and media attention, my argument entails that a very high and increasing 
number of would-be immigrants should be included in border policy-making. This is a 
powerful result: the Coercion Principle internally undermines the self-determination argument 
in very many high-profile cases. And these are precisely the cases where the self-
determination argument is typically invoked.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the self-determination argument for the right to unilaterally control 
one’s territorial borders is internally undermined by the Coercion Principle. However this 
argument addresses the Problem of the Self, it is bound to rely on this principle. On the one 
hand, since one of the core ideas of democratic theory is that autonomous beings should not 
be subjected to coercive power without having a say in how it is exercised, specifying the self 
politically will plausibly appeal to a variant of this principle. On the other, specifying the self 
pre-politically fails to evade this problem, because a similar issue arises one step further 
down the argumentative line, when justifying the Territorial thesis: even if the Bounded Self 
thesis could be justified, the inference from the right to self-determination to the territorial 
right to exclude relies on the Coercion Principle. Finally, since border controls coerce very 
many would-be immigrants, the self-determination argument’s reliance on this principle 
renders it self-defeating. Or more precisely, it renders it self-defeating in the numerous 
instances where would-be immigrants are subjected to coercion.  
This argument has two noteworthy upshots. First, in addition to defending Abizadeh’s 
argument against detractors, I have extended it significantly. Abizadeh suggests that 
democratic theory opposes the Bounded Self thesis. But it is compatible with this conclusion 
that such a thesis may be justified by pre-political principles external to democratic theory, 
provided that the moral force of these principles outweighs that of the Coercion Principle. My 
argument rules out this possibility, by suggesting that even such pre-political arguments rely 
on the Coercion Principle when justifying the Territorial thesis. A limitation of this extension 
is that I cannot rule out a priori the existence of alternative justifications that do not do so. 
Nevertheless, I have shown that the main attempts to derive the unilateral territorial right to 
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exclude from the right to self-determination rely on this principle, and that attempts to 
directly derive the right to exclude from the grounds that justify the right to self-
determination encounter severe difficulties.  
So, in virtue of giving strong grounds for thinking that the Coercion Principle is also at 
play in justifications of the Territorial thesis, my argument has greater scope than Abizadeh’s 
in two respects. It should have traction with those who (in spite of my defense) remain 
unconvinced by Abizadeh’s claim that the Coercion Principle is a core principle of 
democratic theory, so that the political strategy of justifying the Bounded Self thesis fails. 
And it should be compelling even against those who accept Abizadeh’s claim but attempt to 
circumvent it by specifying the self pre-politically.  
Second, and more programmatically, the fact that the ideal of self-determination cannot 
coherently support a unilateral territorial right to exclude should urge us to rethink the 
concept of collective self-determination. Briefly put, and as Iris Marion Young once argued, 
self-determination should be seen less as a matter of possessing a sphere of freedom from 
interference, and more as consisting of freedom from arbitrary interference.70  Considered in 
this way, self-determination requires not exclusive control over a territory, as defenders of the 
self-determination argument have tried to argue, but rather the right to participate politically 
in all exercises of power to which one is subjected.  
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